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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
APPEAL AND EaoR-MoRE TnAN ONE APPEAL-EXERCISE OF RIGHr TO
"SHORT" APPEAL, PRECLUDES USE OF "LONG" APPEAL.-In Spivey Building
Corporation v. Illinois Iowa Power Company' the defendant, within the
ninety-day period allowed by Section 76(1) of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act, 2 duly perfected a "short" appeal, but the same was dismissed for
failure to file a transcript of proceedings. Thereafter, and within one
year, the defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal under Section 76(1)
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, stating that it could not perfect the
earlier appeal for reasons beyond its control. This petition was denied
by the Appellate Court,3 but a certificate of importance was granted to
the Supreme Court of Illinois. The latter held that the judgment dis-
missing the second appeal was proper, since only one appeal may be
granted to a litigant.
Under the earlier practice, the right to an appeal was statutory and
strict compliance therewith was essential. 4 Failure to comply, however,
still allowed the litigant a chance to secure review if he could secure a
writ of error.5 That writ now appears to have been abolished and the
present method of appeal substituted therefor, which authorizes the
litigant a "short" appeal as a matter of right, and a "long" appeal
upon a showing of merit in the appeal and the absence of culpable
negligence in not using the former.7 The several Appellate Courts in the
state have been in conflict as to whether the attempted exercise of the
"short" appeal prevented recourse to the "long" appeal.8 The decision
in the instant case was foreshadowed in People ex rel. Bender v. Davis9 in
which the Illinois Supreme Court granted mandamus to compel the
Appellate Court of the Third District to expunge an order granting
leave to appeal after the "short" appeal had been dismissed for ap-
pellant's failure to assign error. By the decision in the instant case,
the court indicates a refusal to recede from the position taken, despite
the suggestion that the right to have a judgment reviewed should not be
1 375 Ill. 128, 30 N.E. (2d) 641 (1940).
2 fll. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 200(1).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 200(1).
4 People ex rel. v. Franklin County Building Ass'n, 329 Ill. 582, 161 N.E. 56
(1928); People ex rel. v. Andrus, 299 Ill. 50, 132 N.E. 225 (1921); Beale v. Hileman,
115 Ill. 355, 5 N.E. 108 (1886); and Anderson v. Steger, 173 Ill. 112, 50 N.E. 665
(1898).
5 Drummer Creek Drainage Dist. v. Roth, 244 M1l. 68, 91 N.E. 63 (1910).
6 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 198(1). See suggestions that it is still available.
Hinton, Illinois Civil Practice Act 282 (1934). Contra, McCaskill, Illinois Civil
Practice Act, Anno. 200 (1933).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 200. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110,
§ 259.29.
8 Granting such privilege: Melsha v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 299 Ill.
App. 157, 19 N.E. (2d) 753 (1939). Contra: Schroeder v. Campbell, 289 Ill. App. 337,
7 N.E. (2d) 329 (1937); Moss v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 289 Ill. App. 379, 7 N.E. (2d)
468 (1937).
9 365 Ill. 389, 6 N.E. (2d) 643 (1937).
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denied through a mere technical fault, to one having a meritorious
case. 10 However, the court has displayed liberality in other directions."
The decision in the instant case, therefore, serves as a warning to
the unsuccessful litigant that if he exercises his right to a "short" appeal
under Section 76(1) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,12 he must be dili-
gent in prosecuting the same, and if it is in any way defective he must
correct the error therein rather than allow it to be dismissed.'3 The
remedy of the "long" appeal must hereafter be confined to one who has
had no recourse, rather than a defective recourse, to the "short" ap-
peal method of securing review. B. GEsoss
APPEAL AND ERuoR-NEcEssrrY op NEW TRxA-RGHT OF APPELLATE
COURT, ON REVERSING JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT, TO PASS ON
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR NEW TRAL.-In the trial of jury cases a practice
has sprung up of presenting alternative motions for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict or for a new trial. By reason thereof, the trial
judges have been led to pass on the first alternative and, having de-
cided to grant the same, to neglect the second, leaving action thereon
to the Appellate Court should the latter reverse the ruling granting
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Such practice accorded with the
provisions of Section 68 (3c) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act' and the
power thus conferred had been exercised by the Appellate Court. The
Illinois Supreme Court, however, has now declared such provision un-
constitutional, as attempting to confer original jurisdiction on the Ap-
pellate Court, 2 and has suggested that if the problem of final settlement
of litigation is to be left in the hands of the appellate tribunal, it can
only be done by having the trial court indicate its alternative rulings
on such motions.
In the cases producing this result, the juries had returned verdicts
in favor of the several plaintiffs; defense attorneys then presented al-
ternative motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new
trial; the trial court in each instance granted the first alternative and
rendered judgment for the defendant, neglecting to pass upon the other
alternative as being unnecessary; on appeal the Appellate Court, both
for the First and Fourth Districts, reversed the trial court, proceeded to
10 See note to Melsha v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 299 Ill. App. 157, 19
N.E. (2d) 753 (1939), in 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 277.
11 See, for example, Francke v. Eadie, 373 Ill. 600, 26 N.E. (2d) 853 (1940), in
which appellant was given an opportunity to correct erroneous transcript which
omitted to set forth the notice of appeal, though the same had, in fact, been filed.
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 200(1).
is He may not abandon it and prosecute another "short" appeal within the
ninety-day period. See also Lanquist v. Grossman, 282 Ill. App. 181 (1935);
Corrigan v. Von Schill College of Chiropody, 277 Ill. App. 350 (1934); Cullinan v.
Cullinan, 285 II. App. 272, 1 N.E. (2d) 921 (1936).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 192.
2 Sprague v. Goodrich, 376 Ill. 80, 32 N.E. (2d) 897 (1941) reversing 304 Ill. App.
556, 26 N.E. (2d) 884 (1941); Walaite v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway
Company, 376 Ill. 59, 33 N.E. (2d) 119 (1941), reversing 306 Ill. App. 5, 28 N.E. (2d)
149 (1940). Farthing, J., dissented in each case without opinion.
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deny the motion for new trial, and entered judgment on the verdict in
favor of the several plaintiffs; each case was, in turn, reversed by the
Illinois Supreme Court with directions to remand to the trial court in
order to secure a ruling on the motion for new trial.
The jurisdiction conferred on the Illinois Appellate Court is purely
appellate3 and was clearly so understood prior to the enactment of the
provision of the Civil Practice Act herein involved.4 It is also clear that
the parties could not, by consent, confer any other jurisdiction upon it.5
In passing upon a motion for new trial, the appellate tribunal is neces-
sarily exercising original jurisdiction,6 and is not, in any way, reviewing
the conduct of a nisi prius court. The mere statement of the problem
demonstrates the invalidity of Section 68 (3c) of the Illinois Civil Prac-
tice Act 7 except as it may be saved by having the trial court indicate,
in advance of appeal, what action it would have taken upon the motion
for a new trial had it not decided to grant a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.8 The Illinois Civil Practice Act does not prohibit such
alternative rulings and, had the trial court so indicated its decision on
each point, the Appellate Court would then have been in a position to
exercise its proper function, to-wit: review both questions, and thereafter
to enter an appropriate judgment. Such, at least, is the practice under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure9 approved in Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. Duncan,10 and tacitly indicated by the Illinois Supreme Court
as the proper method to be pursued in state cases.
APPEARANcE-JURISDIcTION ACQuIRED---WHrTHER PLEADING OVER TO ME~rrs
AFrER SPECIAL APPEARANCE AND MOTION UNDER SECTION 48 CONFERS JURISDIc-
TION OVER PERsON-A clear-cut case involving the effect of overruling
a motion to quash the service of summons made pursuant to the pro-
visions of Section 48 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,' following which the
defendant answered to the merits, was presented in Albers, Successor
3 Ill. Constitution, 1870, Art. VI, § 11. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, §§ 199 and 201.
4 Earlier decisions so disclosing are Hawes, Judge v. People ex rel. Pulver, 124
Ill. 560, 17 N.E. 13 (1888); People v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 169 Ill. 201, 48
N.E. 717 (1897); People ex rel. Lydston v. Hoyne, 262 Ill. 82, 104 N.E. 255 (1914).
5 It was argued in the Sprague case, note 2 supra, that the defendant, having
claimed the benefit of Section 68 (3c) of the Civil Practice Act, note 1 supra, in
the trial court, could not, on appeal, urge its unconstitutionality.
6 Corcoran v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill. 567, 27 N.E. (2d) 451 (1940) and note in 19
CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 91 (1940).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 192.
8 The allowance of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict cannot
be regarded as a denial of the alternative motion for new trial. See Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S.-, 61 S. Ct. 189, 85 L. Ed. 132 (1940).
9 Rule 50 (b), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723 (c).
10 311 U.S.-, 61 S. Ct. 189, 85 L. Ed. 132 (1940).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 172 (la). While this section calls for a motion
to dismiss the action, the procedure involved in the instant case was proper by
reason of the fact that the litigation concerned a number of defendants over all
of whom, except appellant, the court has acquired jurisdiction, hence the action
should not be dismissed. See also 16 CHICAGo-KE'T REVIEw 118, on p. 123 (1938).
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Receiver v. Bramberg,2 where the court held such further pleading,
involving a general appearance, did not waive the right to urge the
lack of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant on appeal from an
adverse judgment on the merits.
The defendant in the instant case, an action on a guaranty, was not
served personally. Alias summons was served pursuant to the alterna-
tive method set forth in Section 13 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act3 by
leaving a copy with a maid at defendant's alleged place of residence
and subsequently mailing a copy to the same address. Defendant there-
after filed a special appearance and a motion to quash the service,
supporting such motion with the affidavit of the maid in question to the
effect that she was not employed by defendant and had seen him but
once as a visitor to said premises, together with another affidavit by
defendant's son who was the householder at the address given. Plaintiff
filed no counter-affidavits controverting such averments, 4 yet the de-
fendant's motion was summarily denied. Subsequently the defendant
answered to the merits leading to the judgment above noted.
On appeal, the Appellate Court relied on the language of Rule 21
of the Illinois Supreme Court which reads:
"Where, after denial by the court of a motion under section 48 of
the Civil Practice Act, the defendant pleads over, this shall not be deemed
a waiver of any error in the decision denying such motion. . .This rule
shall extend to the case where the motion is one attacking the jurisdiction
of the court over the person made under a special appearance, and the
pleading over by the defendant has involved the entry on his part of a
general appearance." 5
The court found defendant's procedural steps were correctly taken, 6 the
uncontroverted averments were conclusive to show the service was
fatally defective, and that jurisdiction had not been conferred by the
2 308 Ill. App. 463, 32 N.E. (2d) 362 (1941). Not squarely in point, but involving
the same general problem are In re Rackliffe's Estate, 366 II. 22, 7 N.E. (2d) 754
(1937) noted in 15 CHICAGO-KENT Rmw 313 (1937), and Chicago City Bank and
Trust Co. v. Kaplan, 281 Ill. App. 97 (1935) in which the section in question was
held not to apply to a garnishment action by reason of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110,
§ 125.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 137.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 172 (3) authorizes counter-affidavits by opponent.
As to effect of filing such counter-affidavits in a legal action, see note in 17
CHICAGO-KENT LAW Rzvrew 372 (1939).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 259.21. It should be noted that the operation of
this section is confined to motions made under Section 48, upon the limited grounds
therein enumerated, and does not apply to motions made under section 45 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act.
6 On this point see Brandt v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 285 Ill. App. 212,
1 N.E. (2d) 873 (1936), noted in 14 CHICAGO-KENT REviEw 369 (1936), wherein the
special appearance and motion based on lack of jurisdiction of the person was
coupled with a motion to dismiss on the ground of res adjudicata and the joinder
was regarded as amounting to a general appearance.
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participation of defendant in a hearing on the merits, 7 hence it reversed
the judgment with directions to sustain the motion to quash the service
of summons.
The procedural methods held available in the instant case are an
admirable improvement on the older methods, involving as they did
the likelihood of a double hearing, both in the trial court and on appeal,
first as to the question of jurisdiction and then as to the merits of the
case. The defendant may now safely seek a decision on the merits, after
proper objection to the lack of jurisdiction over his person, and thereby
gain a double advantage for he may be likely to secure a decision on
the jurisdictional question or secure a judgment in the trial court upon
the justice and validity of his opponent's claim with the right to review
the decision on either point or both by the one hearing and the one
appeal.
PROCESS-PEsRONAL SERVICE-WHETHER PERSONAL SERVICE IS INVALID 37
MADE ON SUNDAY-The validity of personal service of summons in a
civil action when made on a Sunday was called into question in Peder-
sen v. Logan Square State & Savings Bank.' In that case, a suit
to enforce the constitutional liability of stockholders in a defunct state
bank, two of the many defendants, having been personally served with
summons on a Sunday, neither appeared nor answered and a default
decree was entered against them. After service of execution, the defend-
ants in question filed a petition seeking to vacate such decree and
quash the service of summons, which petition ,was granted over the
protest of the decree-creditor predicated on the ground that the chancel-
lor was without authority to disturb the original decree inasmuch as
more than thirty days had elapsed between the entry thereof and the
filing of the petition.- On appeal, held: decree granting prayer of peti-
tion affirmed, as, the service being invalid, no jurisdiction existed in the
court to enter the original decree.
In support of such decision the court relied on two early Illinois
cases not strictly in point 3 and a provision of the criminal code, first
7 Such would have been the inevitable result under the former Illinois practice.
See Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 17 N.E. 232 (1888); Haley v. Reidelberger,
340 Ill. 154, 172 N.E. 19 (1930).
1 309 Ill. App. 54, 32 N.E. (2d) 644 (1941).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Oh. 110, § 174(7). The petition presented, however, appears
to have been based on Section 72 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1939, Ch. 110, § 196), permitting application for correction of errors at any time
within five years.
3 Scammon v. City of Chicago, 40 Ill. 146 (1866), a proceeding to condemn land
for failure to pay a special assessment levied thereon. The owner relied on the
invalidity of the original assessment because notice by publication had not been
properly given inasmuch as the six days' notice required by city charter included
a Sunday, which contention was upheld. Baxter v. People, 8 InI. (3 Gilman) 368
(1846), in which a judgment of conviction for murder and ordering the death
penalty was held invalid because pronounced on a Sunday.
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enacted in 1821, which reads: "Whoever disturbs the peace and good order
of society by labor (works of necessity and charity excepted), or by any
amusement or diversion on Sunday, shall be fined not exceeding $25."4
These were regarded as sufficient to establish a policy in this state,
not altered by any subsequent expression of either the courts or the
legislature, 5 that judicial acts, including the service of process which
is an initial step toward such action, must not be performed on the
Sabbath, except where required by necessity, 6 and if so performed are
to be regarded as absolute nullity.
Decisions in other jurisdictions, despite specific statutes prohibiting
the transaction of judicial business on Sunday, have held service of
summons on that day valid and binding, treating the same as a mere
ministerial act rather than one of judicial character, hence not within
the prohibition of such statutes.7 The distinction thus drawn is not without
merit. Service of criminal process may be made at any time in this
state by virtue of a specific provision of the criminal code.8 Further,
such emergency processes as attachment 9 and writ of injunction' ° may
issue and be executed without regard to whether the day is a legal
one or dies non juridicus. Doubtless the court deciding the instant case
would justify such action on the part of a public official as being proper
as it might be said to be supported by a specifically stated public policy,
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 549.
5 The court noted that in 1939 the legislature, while repealing the sections of
the criminal code immediately preceding the one in question, which prohibited
the opening of a tippling house on Sunday, and defined Sunday (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1937, Ch. 38, §§ 547, 548), had not seen fit to disturb the provision relied on. It did,
however, comment on the public policy it felt thus evidenced by saying: "When
one considers the extent to which labor and amusements have entered into the
present life of the people of this State . .. [the] language contained . . .sounds
strange, indeed, and not in accord with what seems to be the spirit of the times."
-309 Ill. App. 54, 59, 32 N.E. (2d) 644, 646 (1941).
6 The "necessity" referred to includes receiving verdict, Baxter v. People, 8 Ill.
(3 Gilman) 368 (1846); taking a recognizance, Johnston v. People, 31 Ill. 469
(1863); and approving a bail bond, People v. Berof, 290 Ill. App. 1, 7 N.E. (2d) 919
(1937).
7 Heisen v. Smith, 138 Cal. 216, 71 P. 180 (1902); State ex rel. Hay v. Alderson,
49 Mont. 387, 142 P. 210 (1914); and Hastings v. Columbus, 42 Ohio St. 585 (1885)
were noted in the opinion in the instant case. The court might have added Pelham
v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation, 23 Ala. App. 93, 121 So. 448 (1929);
Pelton v. Muntzing, 24 Colo. App. 1, 131 P. 281 (1913); Van v. Dean, 192
Iowa 1311, 184 N.W. 646 (1921); Chaney v. Stacy, 247 Ky. 520, 57 S.W. (2d) 530
1933); McDannald v. Wilmoth, 82 W. Va. 719, 97 S.E. 132 (1918); and
Lamar-Wells Co. v. Hamilton Co., 237 F. 54 (1916). Contra: Chafin v. Tumlin, 20
Ga. App. 433, 93 S.E. 50 (1917); Van Bueren v. Board of Commissioners of City of
Wildwood, 9 N.J. Misc. 187, 153 A. 260 (1931), by reason of express statute for-
bidding service of process on Sunday; Atoka Milling Co. v. Groomer, 131 Okla.
174, 268 P. 208 (1928); and State ex rel. Barks v. Superior Court of Skamania
County, 144 Wash. 44, 257 P. 837 (1927).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 659. s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 11, § 12.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 69, § 23. See also Langabier v. The Fairbury, Pontiac
and Northwestern R.R. Co., 64 Ill. 243 (1872).
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or else be sanctioned under the express exemption contained in the crimi-
nal code above noted.
Should the fact that the official violates that provision and thereby
subjects himself to a fine, invalidate his action in making the service?
It would be unlikely that the court would deny the ordinary laborer his
hire even though his conduct fell within the prohibition," and cer-
tainly a contract made on that day would withstand criticism. 12 Is the
labor in serving process, which, by reason of Section 6 of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act,"1 may now be performed by a private citizen, so
intrinsically different that it should be singled out for condemnation?
The answer appears, at present, to be in the affirmative in this state,
even though, by so acting, the purpose of process, to-wit: notice to the
defendant of the pendency of proceedings, is fully satisfied, and the
service thereof does not involve any disturbance of peace and
good order.
14
11 McCurdy v. The Alaska and Chicago Commercial Company, 102 Ill. App. 120
(1902).
12 Richmond v. Moore, 107 Ill. 429 (1883); Prout v. Hoy Oil Company, 263 Ill. 54,
105 N.E. 26 (1914).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 130(1).
14 It should be noted that the "labor" condemned by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38,
§ 549, is not merely any act of work done but only such acts as do disturb the
peace. Reaping grain on Sunday, while amounting to a disturbance, was excused
by necessity in Johnson v. People, 42 Ill. App. 594 (1891), while plowing on Sun-
day, by a Seventh Day Adventist, was held not to amount to a disturbance in Foll
v. People, 66 Ill. App. 405 (1896). Quaere: How much "disturbance," other than
the defendant's chagrin, is involved in the usual service of summons?
